In his article "The
Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories," Michael Stocker argues that
mainstream ethical theories, namely consequentialism and deontology, are
incompatible with maintaining personal relations of love, friendship, and
fellow feeling because they both overemphasise the role of duty, obligation,
and rightness, and ignore the role of motivation in morality. Stocker states
that the great goods of life, i.e. love, friendship, etc., essentially contain
certain motives and preclude others, such as those demanded by mainstream
ethics.11
In his paper "Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality,"
Peter Railton argues that a particular version of consequentialism, namely
sophisticated consequentialism, is not incompatible with love,
affection and acting for the sake of others. In the essays "War and Massacre"
and "Autonomy and Deontology," Thomas Nagel holds that a theory of absolutism,
i.e. deontology, may be compatible with maintaining personal commitments. The
first objective of this paper is to demonstrate that despite the efforts of
both Railton and Nagel, consequentialism and deontology do not in fact
incorporate personal relations into morality in a satisfactory way. This essay
shows that Stocker’s challenge may also hold against versions of Virtue
Ethics, such as that put forth by Rosalind Hursthouse in her article "Virtue
Theory and Abortion." The second objective of this discussion is to examine
criticisms of Stocker made by Kurt Baier in his article "Radical Virtue
Ethics." This essay demonstrates that in the end Baier’s objections are not
convincing.
Stocker begins his paper by
arguing that modern ethical theories fail because, by and large, they deal
only with the reasons and justifications for people’s actions and ignore
people’s motivations. This failure to address the role of motivation has led
to a form of schizophrenia in an important area of value;22
people are unable to reconcile their motives with the moral justifications for
their actions. Stocker highlights the constraints that motives impose on both
ethical theory and the ethical life in order to show that only when
justifications and motives are in harmony can people lead the good life.
Stocker believes that
mainstream ethical theories, like consequentialism and deontology, make it
impossible for people to reconcile their reasons and motives because these
theories demand that people perform acts for the sake of duty or for the good,
as opposed to because they care about the people who are affected by their
actions. According to Stocker, these ethical theories completely leave out the
individual, and so they can provide no account of those personal relationships
that develop when people are an essential part of what is valued.33
Stocker states that it is not just that other people are not valued by
consequentialism and deontology, but rather that people in general - both the
agent and the recipients of that agency - are left out of the picture. Thus,
mainstream moral theories put people in a psychologically uncomfortable
position that makes it impossible for them to achieve the good life in an
integrated way.44
This criticism may become
clearer with an example. With regard to the personal relationship of love,
Stocker states that it is essential to the concept of love that the agent care
for the beloved, meaning that he act for the sake of the beloved as a final
goal of his concern and action.55
To do otherwise, i.e. for him to act considerately toward his beloved in order
to promote the good, to lead a pleasing life, or to fulfil a duty is to view
the beloved as replaceable, meaning that anything else that achieved the same
effects would do as well. If, he acts for these reasons, then he does not in
fact act for the sake of his beloved, and thereby, his feelings are
conceptually incompatible with the definition of love.
Stocker indicates that there
are serious ramifications for adopting dehumanising ethical theories that only
look at a small part of morality. He states that it is necessary to consider
what the impact is on us as individuals, groups, and societies, not only to
view others as essentially replaceable instruments or repositories of
non-specific value, but also to believe ourselves to be viewed as such.66
Stocker asks what sort of lives would people have if they never cared for
others except as a means to their own ends, or if they believed that no one
else loved them for their own sake? Ethical theories that promote such
impersonal interactions between people require very powerful defences,
according to Stocker. This is the essence of Stocker’s challenge to mainstream
ethical theories. It is now possible to determine whether or not the defences
made by either Railton or Nagel are sufficient to show that their respective
ethical theories are compatible with caring personal relationships.
In "Alienation,
Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality," Peter Railton states that
abiding by a moral theory need not, as Stocker claims, alienate people from
the personal commitments that make life worthwhile.77
Railton does admit that living up to the demands of morality may lead to a
degree of alienation or estrangement from one’s personal concerns. However, he
does not think that this alienation is sufficient to show that
consequentialism, i.e. the theory that people should act in the way that will
most promote the good, is self-defeating.88
Railton argues that this alienation can be mitigated by dealing with other
sorts of alienation that morality may induce.99
He believes that his modified version of consequentialism, known as
sophisticated consequentialism, addresses these different forms of
alienation, and thereby, allows people to maintain personal, caring
relationships, and still adhere to the values of an ethical theory.
Like Stocker, Railton argues
that love, friendship, and fellow feeling are among the most important
‘contributors’ to what makes life worthwhile.1010
Railton believes that such personal relationships can be reconciled with the
practical reasoning of his version of consequentialism in a way that does not
divide the self, and thereby, lead to the moral schizophrenia that Stocker
mentions. Railton also states that his modified consequentialism does not
leave out the individual; he recognises that denying the significance of other
people undercuts the significance of the self. The question is: Does Railton’s
theory really achieve these things, and if so, is that enough to make
consequentialism compatible with maintaining loving personal relations?
Before outlining the aspects of
his version of consequentialism, Railton identifies two problems of dominant
consequentialist theories. First, these theories fail to see things other than
subjective states as having any intrinsic value, and second, they tend to
reduce all intrinsically valuable things to happiness. Both of these problems
indicate forms of alienation, according to Railton. In order to avoid these
pitfalls, consequentialism needs to take a form that, first, allows things
apart from subjective states to be intrinsically valuable, such as love,
affection, personal ties, and second, allows goals other than happiness to be
treated as equally valuable.1111
Railton divides
consequentialism into two different types, namely, subjective consequentialism
and objective consequentialism. The former is the view that whenever a person
must choose between two different actions she should attempt to determine
which would most promote the good, and then act accordingly.1212
This type of consequentialism identifies a particular mode of decision making.
Objective consequentialism, on the other hand, states that the criterion of
rightness of an action is whether it in fact would most promote the good of
all the actions available to the agent.1313
This version is concerned with the actual outcomes of a person’s actions. The
question of deliberation is only dealt with in terms of the tendencies of
certain forms of decision making to promote appropriate outcomes.1414
Railton states that the sophisticated consequentialist is the person who
endeavours to live an objectively consequentialist life, but "who need not set
special stock on any particular form of decision making, and therefore does
not necessarily seek to lead a subjectively consequentialist life."1515
In other words, the sophisticated consequentialist will in some situations not
employ consequentialist reasoning when deciding how to act.
One can question whether or not
it is contradictory for a sophisticated consequentialist sometimes to reject
subjective consequentialist decision making. Bernard Williams believes there
is a flaw in consequentialist theory since it must usher itself from the scene
as a mode of decision making in numerous situations.1616
Railton responds that this is not a compelling criticism of his version of
consequentialism. He feels that Williams exaggerates the extent to which
consequentialist decision making must be left out in order for the
sophisticated consequentialist to choose between different actions. The
sophisticated consequentialist’s motivational structure in fact meets a
counterfactual condition; he need not always act for the sake of promoting the
most good, but he would not act as he does if it were not compatible with him
leading an objectively consequentialist life.1717
In order to explain the
difference between subjective and objective consequentialism, Railton
contrasts the explanations that two ‘model’ husbands, John and Juan, give for
why they treat their wives as they do. John states that he knows his wife Anne
better than anyone else, so he is in a better position to know what will make
her happy, and he feels that people should help each other when they are in a
good position to do so.1818
Besides, he receives a lot of pleasure from doing so and has such affection
for Anne that it is no great burden. John’s subjectively consequentialist
reasoning is disconcerting because it leaves Anne and their relationship out
of the picture. There is an obvious estrangement between his feelings and the
reasons for his behaviour. His reasoning is such that it prevents him from
realising in his relationships those values that he would recognise as
crucially important.1919
Juan, on the other hand, states that he loves his wife Linda and even likes
her, and so it is natural for him to care for her. Besides, it is a better
world when people can have a relationship like theirs; no one could if
everyone always looked to see who was most in need.2020
Railton states that what Juan recognises as morally required is not
incompatible with him acting directly for Linda’s sake. He is a sophisticated
consequentialist; he would seek to lead a different life if he thought what he
did were not morally defensible. There is, however, a degree of alienation in
Juan’s reasoning, which Railton admits. However, Railton does not think that
this alienation is sufficient to remove the human value from Juan and Linda’s
relationship.2121
Now, it is possible to assess
to what extent Railton’s defence of sophisticated consequentialism overcomes
the problems that Stocker identifies for mainstream ethical theories. One
problem with Railton’s notion of sophisticated consequentialism, which he
readily admits, is the fact that since objective consequentialism has a
definite criterion for right action, it presents an empirical question to all
people regarding which modes of decision making they should use in different
situations. This is an extremely difficult question for anyone to answer
because the outcomes of our actions are never certain. It does not seem
plausible that a person seeking to lead an objectively consequentialist
lifestyle could be successful because not only must that person decide what
mode of decision making to apply in a given situation, but also she must be
fairly certain that the one she applies will in fact most promote the
good.
A second major flaw with
Railton’s version of consequentialism is that ultimately the reasons for
acting according to a particular mode of decision making, be it
consequentialist, deontological, egoistic, or altruistic, is to most promote
the good, i.e. to meet objectively consequentialist ethical demands. One can
question whether or not this does allow for the maintenance of true
loving personal relationships because for all that on a small-scale people may
care for each other, this caring only covers up the larger goal - to lead an
objectively consequentialist life. For example, if a person realises that her
instrumental attitude toward others prevents her from promoting the most good,
then she may adopt decision making procedures that focus more on the needs of
her intimates, which will improve her personal relationships with them and
presumably contribute to the overall good. The problem is that she does this
in order to promote the most good, not because of the love she feels for those
closest to her. So, as this example shows, even though people may not be
either replaceable or instrumental repositories of non-specific value in
Railton’s sophisticated consequentialism, they are not entirely valued as
unique individuals. In the end Railton’s view does allow for greater
interpersonal relations on a day to day basis, but it does not show that
consequentialism is truly compatible with real love and friendship.
In his article "Autonomy and
Deontology" Thomas Nagel states that an important issue in ethics is the way
in which the lives, interests and welfare of others make claims on us, and how
those claims can be reconciled with living a moral life.2222
He argues that the value of things in this world depends on our individual
aims and concerns, including the concerns we have for other people, which are
reflected in both our relationships with them and the place we give to these
relationships in our lives.2323
In the article "War and Massacre" Nagel argues that absolutism or deontology
recognises the importance of other people because it imposes limits on what
may be done to others even when both the end in question is a worthy one and
adhering to restrictions may be costly.2424
Some acts, like murder, cannot be justified no matter what consequences may
result.2525
It is important to note that absolute restrictions do not apply either to what
people fail to prevent or to what occurs as a mere side effect of their
actions. In order to violate a deontological constraint, a person must
deliberately maltreat someone else as either a means or as an end. Constraints
are universal prohibitions that do not derive their value from their degree of
usefulness;2626
rather, they stem from the common-sense intuition that it is wrong to harm
innocent people.
Nagel recognises that
deontological constraints are an obscure, and possibly paradoxical, notion,
which complicate an already complicated picture.2727
The air of paradox arises because deontological constraints order people not
to perform certain morally reprehensible actions even if they will prevent a
greater number of similar acts from occurring. Nagel responds that
deontological constraints, and the absolutist intuitions on which they are
based, are important because "often [they are] the only barrier between us and
the abyss of utilitarian apologetics for large-scare murder."2828
In short, absolutist intuitions underpin a valid and fundamental type of moral
judgement, which cannot be overridden by consequentialist principles.2929
On the surface, deontology
appears more successful than consequentialism at refuting the attacks made by
Stocker. This is because, prima facie, the individual is not left out
of the picture in deontology. The purposes of this ethical theory are both to
recognise and to respect the claims that other people make on us. However,
when we look below the surface we find that deontology is no more compatible
with true, caring, personal relationships than consequentialism. People may
respect the rights of others, keep to their promises, not kill, main, nor
abuse, etc., but these things are all done for the wrong reasons. They are
done because it is required to do them. It is not because a husband loves his
wife that he cares for her, but rather because it is his duty. It is not
because two people are friends that they do not hurt each other, but because
deontology prohibits harming innocent people.
Stocker elucidates this point
with the following example. Mr. Smith visits his friend in the hospital and
initially the friend is very grateful until he realises that Smith does this
act because he feels that it is his duty, not because he cares for the
individual in the hospital bed. Stocker says that there is something missing
here. First, the wrong thing is said to be the proper motive, and second, that
wrong thing is something essentially external to the relationship of these two
people.3030
This example shows that deontology does not in fact allow for the maintenance
of sincere personal relationships because, like consequentialism, it requires
people to act for the wrong reasons, i.e. reasons that contradict the very
definition of concepts such as love and affection. Deontology does not, in the
end, allow people to act strictly for the sake of others.
The above discussion of
consequentialism and deontology indicates the strength of Stocker’s attack on
mainstream ethical theories. It is also possible to argue that Stocker’s
challenge applies to some versions of Virtue Ethics, i.e. the view that
virtue and vice are primary instead of either the good or duty.
In her article "Virtue Theory and Abortion," Rosalind Hursthouse states that
people should both perform those actions that a virtuous person would do, i.e.
those acts that allow human beings to live well, and avoid those actions that
are vicious.3131
More bluntly, she says that people should do act x because x is
kind, charitable, temperate, etc., and avoid act y because y is
unjust, lazy, or dishonest. The problem is that this reasoning, on a less
severe scale perhaps than that of consequentialism or deontology, is also
detached from maintaining true loving personal relations. A person takes care
of a loved one because it is virtuous to do so, not because she genuinely
cares for that individual and acts for the other’s sake alone.
Despite the impact that
Stocker’s arguments have on modern ethical theories, there are some objections
to Stocker’s views, raised by Kurt Baier, that are worth examining. Baier
states that Stocker‘s view is a radical one because it claims that the neglect
of certain questions by mainstream ethics invalidates the answers that these
theories give to the questions that they do examine.3232
Moreover, says Baier, Stocker holds that it is not possible to determine what
is morally incumbent, desirable, or permissible unless things such as the role
of motivation are taken into account. Baier acknowledges that Stocker draws
attention to an important type of relationship, namely, personal
relationships, in which questions of duty and what a virtuous person would do
are related in a way that is different from that assumed by most contemporary
ethicists including, as the above discussion has shown, those who support
modern versions of Virtue Ethics.3333
Baier, however, does not agree
with Stocker that theories that construe moral motives as the desire to do
one’s duty - as deontology does - cannot account for important parts of our
morality such as personal relations.3434
Baier’s response takes a similar tone to that of Railton, even though he
argues from a deontological and not a consequentialist perspective. Baier
states that one could regard moral duty as the task of recognising both that
the moral worth of an act lies in its being something morally desirable,
required, or permissible, and that the act in question would not be done if it
were not so. Therefore, with regard to Stocker’s hospital visitor example,
Baier states that the visitor Smith acts from a moral motive as long as it is
true that the he would not visit his friend if he thought it were morally
required for him to do something else.3535
Baier states, more specifically, that it is only in relationships where the
parties have a duty to preserve loving feelings for each other that the
actions of Smith would lack moral worth. In loving relationships a person
still acts from duty (but not for the sake of duty) when he visits his spouse
in the hospital purely out of love. The duty lies in the fact that he has a
responsibility to maintain loving feelings with his wife.
Baier’s response to Stocker is
disconcerting. His approach to personal relationships is no more satisfying
than that of mainstream consequentialism or deontology because it should not
be due to the fact that one has a duty to love one’s spouse that one
does love one’s spouse. Nor, should it be acceptable that Smith’s
reasons for visiting his friend in the hospital constitute a moral motive
simply because he does not feel morally required to do something else. Here,
as in the ethical theories that Stocker targets, the individual, as a unique,
valued person, is left out of the picture. Therefore, Baier’s response to
Stocker does not seem to carry much weight.
As this paper has shown,
Michael Stocker makes a convincing argument that mainstream ethical theories
are incompatible with maintaining sincere, loving, personal relationships
because they ask people to perform acts for reasons that are inconsistent with
the definition of love, friendship, and fellow feeling. Defenders of both of
the theories that this paper has examined in detail, consequentialism and
deontology, make valiant efforts to argue for their compatibility with caring
for others. Both Railton and Nagel recognise that interpersonal relationships
are in fact the great goods of life, which can only be maintained when people
are valued as unique individuals. However, there seems to be something
inherently incompatible between a strict, universal moral theory and the realm
of the personal. As Stocker states, when we try to act on modern ethical
theories and "try to embody their reasons in our motives - as opposed to
simply seeing whether our or lives or others’ would be approved of by the
theories - then in a quite mad way things start going wrong."3636
The personalities of loved ones get passed over and moral action becomes
self-defeating.3737
It would be nice to end on a
positive note by indicating where we must go from here in our efforts to
establish a universal moral perspective that is both generally applicable and
compatible with personal relations. This is, unfortunately, the task of a much
larger, ongoing discussion. It is sufficient for the purpose of this paper
that Stocker has indeed shown that consequentialism and deontology have not
been successful in their efforts to make room for personal commitments. This
does not mean that these theories are entirely without value, but rather that
we must continue to seek other possible views that better unite the personal
realm with the ethical life.
Endnotes
1 Stocker, Michael, "The Schizophrenia of
Modern Ethical Theories," in Virtue Ethics, R. Crisp, and M. Slote,
eds., New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, p.73 [Back]
2 Ibid., at 68 [Back]
3 Ibid., at 71-72 [Back]
4 Ibid., at 68 [Back]
5 Ibid., at 69 [Back]
6 Ibid., at 72 [Back]
7 Railton, Peter, "Alienation,
Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality," in Consequentialism and Its
Critics. S. Scheffler, ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 1988, p.126
[Back]
8 Ibid., at 93 [Back]
9 Ibid., at 94 [Back]
10 Ibid., at 88 [Back]
11 Ibid., at 108-9 [Back]
12 Ibid., at 113 [Back]
13 Ibid., at 113 [Back]
14 Ibid., at 113 [Back]
15 Ibid., at 114 [Back]
16 Ibid., at 115-6 [Back]
17 Ibid., at 105 [Back]
18 Ibid., at 94 [Back]
19 Ibid., at 115 [Back]
20 Ibid., at 111 [Back]
21 Ibid., at 111-2 [Back]
22 Nagel, Thomas, "Autonomy and Deontology,"
in Consequentialism and Its Critics. Samuel Scheffler, ed., New York:
Oxford University Press, 1988, p.142 [Back]
23 Ibid., at 147 [Back]
24 Nagel, Thomas, "War and Massacre," in
Consequentialism and Its Critics. Samuel Scheffler ed., New York:
Oxford University Press, 1988, p.52 [Back]
25 Ibid., at 55 [Back]
26 Ibid., at 51 [Back]
27 Supra, note 22, at 156 [Back]
28 Supra, note 24, at 54 [Back]
29 Ibid., at 54 [Back]
30 Supra, note 1, at 74 [Back]
31 Hursthouse, Rosalind, "Virtue Theory and
Abortion," in Virtue Ethics, R. Crisp, and M. Slote, eds., New York:
Oxford University Press, 1997, p.218 [Back]
32 Baier, Kurt, "Radical Virtue Ethics," in
Ethical Theory: Character and virtue (Midwest Studies in Philosophy
XIII). French, Uehling, and Wettstein, eds., Notre Dame, in University of
Notre Dame Press, 1988. [Back]
33 Ibid., at 129 [Back]
34 Ibid., at 130 [Back]
35 Ibid., at 130 [Back]
36 Supra, note 1, at 78 [Back]
37 Supra, note 1, at 78 [Back]
Bibliography
Baier, Kurt, "Radical Virtue Ethics," in Ethical Theory: Character and
virtue (Midwest Studies in Philosophy XIII). French, Uehling, and
Wettstein, eds., Notre Dame, in University of Notre Dame Press, 1988.
Blackburn, Simon, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1996.
Hursthouse, Rosalind, "Virtue Theory and Abortion," in Virtue
Ethics, R. Crisp, and M. Slote, eds., New York: Oxford University Press,
1997.
Nagel, Thomas, "Autonomy and Deontology," in Consequentialism and Its
Critics. Samuel Scheffler, ed., New York: Oxford University Press,
1988.
Nagel, Thomas, "War and Massacre," in Consequentialism and Its
Critics. Samuel Scheffler ed., New York: Oxford University Press,
1988.
Railton, Peter, "Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of
Morality," in Consequentialism and Its Critics. S. Scheffler, ed., New
York: Oxford University Press, 1988.
Stocker, Michael, "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories," in
Virtue Ethics, R. Crisp, and M. Slote, eds., New York: Oxford
University Press, 1997.
Williams, Bernard, "Consequentialism and Integrity" in Consequentialism
and Its Critics. S. Scheffler, ed., New York: Oxford University Press,
1988.