The Ubiquity of Equality as a Value
 

Will Kymlicka:

 Every plausible political theory has the same ultimate value, which is equality. They are all ‘egalitarian theories'... (Contemporary Political Philosophy, 2nd ed.)

Amartya Sen:

 [E]very normative theory that has at all stood the test of time seems to demand equality of something – something that is regarded as particularly important in theory. The theories involved are diverse and frequently at odds with each other, but they still seem to have that common feature. ("Why Equality? What Equality?" in Social and Political Philosophy, edited by Sher and Brody, p.604)
 

What are Kymlicka and Sen referring to?
 

Contrast some varieties of equality:

 – Equality before the law

 – Equal basic human rights

 – Economic equality

 – Equal opportunity

 – Equality of consideration for all persons

 – The right to equal treatment

 – Equality of  benefit of the law

 – Equality before God

 – Others?

Some questions:

What is equality?

Is it a single idea or value?

Why is it important?

What role(s) does it play in political philosophy/jurisprudence?
 

General Justice = the whole of morality
 
 

Special Justice = those parts of general justice (morality) concerned with:

 (i) Distributive Justice (aka "social justice" "justice"): That part of moral philosophy concerned with determining the just distribution of divisible social benefits and burdens.

 (ii) Regulatory Justice: That part of moral philosophy concerned with fair regulation of private transactions (Corrective Justice and Justice in Exchange).
 

Our main concern in this course is primarily with (i).

What is the role of equality in (i)?

Aristotle:

 Now [distributive] justice is recognized universally as some sort of equality...justice involves an assignment of things to persons...equals are entitled to equal things. But here we are met with an important question: Equals and unequals in what? This is a difficult question. (Politics, Everyman edition, Warrington trans., p.80-1)
 

Simon Blackburn:

[determining] principles specifying the just distribution of benefits and burdens: the outcome in which everyone receives their due. A common basis is that persons should be treated equally unless reasons for inequality exist: After that the problems include the kind of reasons that justify departing from equality, the role of the state in rectifying inequality, the link between a distributive system and the maximization of well-being. (Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, p.203)

What is the connection between justice and equality?

Why is there this connection?

Three Types of Equality in Theories of Justice

(1) Formal Equality (Proportionate or Aristotelian Equality):

 Treat equals equally; unequals unequally.

Treat like cases alike; unlike cases, not alike.
 

(2) Moral Equality:

The right to treatment as an equal.

       The right to equal concern and respect.
 

(3) Substantive Equality (Social Equality):

 The right to be treated equally. The right to receive an equal amount of some social benefit. Two varieties:

  A) Numerical Substantive Equality: The right to be allotted precisely the same portion of a specific divisible social benefit.

  B) Qualitative Substantive Equality: the right to benefit equally from the distribution of a specific divisible social benefit.

NB: A) and B) can be revised to address sharing of social burdens as well.
 

(1)-(3) are distinct types of equality, but they are

 – often found together.

 – are not conceptually connected from (1) through (3).

 – are not always clearly distinguished.

Is each type represented in every theory of justice?

How would you explain the roles of these types of equality in theories of justice or in normative theories generally?

A possible fourth idea?

Blackburn's (and others') principle:

 ...persons should be treated equally unless reasons for inequality exist.
 

Call this the "Egalitarian Presumption."

Is it the same as Aristotelian or proportionate equality?

JR: this is not equivalent to "treat equals equally; treat unequals unequally. It makes assumptions about moral status and substantive equality that are not implied in the Aristotelian account.

Compare John Rees Equality, ch.7.

(1) Formal Equality (Proportionate or Aristotelian Equality):

Aristotle:

 Consequently, justice involves at least four terms, two persons for whom it is just and two shares which are just. And there will be the same equality between the shares as between the persons, that is, the ratio between the shares will be the same as [equal to] the ratio between the persons. (page 217)

Aristotle's Idea of Equality and Distributive Justice

 – Treat equals equally; unequals unequally.

Or:

 – Equal shares of divisible social benefits/burdens based on equal shares of a morally relevant property; unequal shares based  on unequal shares of morally relevant property.

 Therefore:

  A's share of X  =   A's possession of Y
  B's share of X       B's possession of Y

  X = divisible social benefits
  Y = morally relevant property (moral merit)
 

What constitute X and Y are crucial and difficult questions for theory of distributive justice, as Aristotle recognized (see quote above).

What sorts of things might X and Y be?

What does Aristotle say they are?
 

X = wealth, honours, social standing.
Y = birth (class, sex, nationality), contribution to polis, earned respect.

What might moderns say constitute X and Y?
 

Does formal equality demonstrate an interesting connection between justice and equality?
 

 (1) a type of proportionate equality (equal portions to the extent that there is equal moral merit).

 (2) leaves answered what the important moral questions unanswered. What are the relevant moral considerations? Treat equals equally, unequals unequally equal/unequal in what senses?

 (3) is consistent with rejecting moral equality and any form of substantive equality.

 (4) requires appeal to moral properties/principles that identifies the sense(s) in which equals are to be treated equally and unequals unequally.

 (5) a requirement of consistency.

 (6) has historically been a much cherished legal ideal...
 

Is, then, formal equality an interesting moral idea at all? (See Pojman "Theories of Equality: A Critical Analysis")

Is there agreement on what the relevant moral considerations are?

(2) Moral Equality
 

 The right to equal concern and respect.
 

(Dworkin calls this "the egalitarian plateau.")
 

What sort of moral claim is this?

Is it a more demanding idea morally than Formal equality? If so, how?

See Locke, Mill, Rawls, Kymlicka, Sen, etc.
Moral Equality:

 (2) Is reflected in different general theories of morality/justice, which take different views of what equal concern and respect requires.
 

How do we resolve disputes in (2) (which are just disputes about which is the best theory of justice)?

 – Short answer: we look at the strength of the arguments that each theory offers in its own defence and/or in its criticism of other theories.
Add Moral Equality to the Analysis of Formal Equality:
 

 – Treating equals equally requires recognizing that individuals are entitled to/have rights to equal concern and respect.

Now contrast Aristotle's account of Y with modern and egalitarian accounts:
 

Some modern ideas:

Y (morally relevant property) = (impartial consideration of an individual's) productive contribution, needs, talents, (etc).

X (divisible social goods) = money, wealth, recognition, leisure time, education, opportunities, political freedoms, etc.

Note this can still produce radical inequalities in distributions of social benefits/burdens. Why?
 

Crucial question for Distributive Justice: Do these accounts of Y reflect adequately equal concern and respect for all individuals?

Another modern idea:

Y = humanity (equal concern and respect for the equal humanity of all human beings).

Y = rational beings (equal concern and respect for persons who have the capacity for rational moral agency)
 
 

These examples of interpretations of moral equality can lead to fairly strict egalitarian distributions of divisible goods and, therefore, extreme applications of substantive equality (the right to equal treatment).

Does not resolve issues between numerical and qualitative equality?

Are such defences of extreme egalitarianism plausible?

Do these theories imply the "Harrison Bergeron" nightmare?
 

(1) Formal Equality is an aspect of any principled or rule-governed institution.

(2) Moral Equality is an accepted feature of almost all theories of justice ("has stood the test of time" as Sen says).

(3) What is meant by Moral Equality is a matter of dispute and argument between deontologists and teleologists and theorists of justice, but at bottom seems committed to some degree of impartial treatment of individuals. Just what this implies is regarded by many to be the central topic of moral philosophy.

(4) Nearly all theories of justice also defend Substantive Equality in some space in addition to Moral Equality. In particular, they often claim, if only implicitly, that certain types of substantive equality flow ultimately from their conceptions of equal concern and respect for persons.